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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

;
i
;i

Case No. 880378-CA
(Priority No. 2)

RAYMOND ORTIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a criminal action
filed within 30 days of the date of sentencing of the Defendant.
Because the Defendant was convicted of two Second Degree Felonies,
jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Section 78-2a3, Utah Code Annotated.

(1953, as amended).

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a direct appeal in a criminal case from a sentence
and commitment of Appellant to the Utah State Prison for two Second
Degree Felonies after a finding of guilty to the offense of Theft,
a Second Degree Felony, under Utah Code Annotated, Section 6-405,
(1953, as amended).

. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

The Defendant was denied a fair trial and the conviction

should be reversed because the Court did not enter any findings in
denying the Motion to limit the prosecution from cross-examining
the Defendant as to his prior convictions,
2.

The Court erred in not declaring a mistrial in light of

the Prosecutor's statements.
3.

The evidence was insufficient to prove intent and the

evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict*
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 12, states that , "In criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel . . . ".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The Defendant-Appellant was charged in an information with

two Counts of Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and was convicted of
both Counts.

After trial, the Court sentenced the Defendant on

one Count after granting the Motion of the Defendant to sentence
on both Counts of being part of a single criminal episode.
B.

Course of Proceeding.
After the jury found the Defendant-Appellant guilty, he was

sentenced on May 9, 1988, to a Second Degree Felony.
Appeal was filed within thirty days.
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A Notice of

C.

Disposition at Trial Court.
The Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the

conviction entered after the jury verdict and the Court denied the
Motion for a mistrial. ,
RELEVANT FACTS
The trial held in this case commenced on March 31, 1988 before
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, District Court Judge. The trial was
held

before

a

jury and

the Vor

Dire

of

the

jury was

not

transcribed.
The first witness called by the State of Utah was Reginald
Corona who testified that he owned a bar located at 6750 South
State Street, Murray, Utah (Pg. 4). Mr. Corona indicated that in
July, 1987, he became acquainted with the Defendant, Raymond Ortiz,
and met him at a business establishment that was located just south
of his bar. Mr. Corona recalled that the name of the business was
Eagle Tire and that during their first conversation, Mr. Ortiz
indicated that he had just purchased the business (Pg. 6).
The witness indicated that the Defendant told him that he had
borrowed money through the S.B.A. and that after Mr. Corona
indicted that he was interested in also obtaining an S.B.A. loan,
Mr. Ortiz stated that he knew somebody who could get the loan for
him (Pg. 7). The witness testified that Mr. Ortiz indicated to him
that he would have to "front some money to show that he was in good
faith" in order to get a loan of between $350,000 and $400,000.
Mr. Corona then testified that a later conversation took place at
his bar three to four days after the first conversation, at which
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time the Defendant told Mr. Corona that he had not been able to
contact any person concerning the loan (Pg. 9). The witness then
indicated that several days after this conversation, the witness
indicated Mr. Ortiz said that the person who would obtain the loan
for him was, according to Mr. Corona, in charge of S.B.A. loans
through Valley Bank and that he would deliver the paperwork to this
individual on behalf of Mr. Corona (Pg. 10).
Mr. Corona indicated that several weeks after this initial
conversation, a subsequent conversation took place at the tire shop
at which time Mr. Ortiz indicated to Mr. Corona that Mr. Ortiz
needed to bring $5,000.00 in cash in a cashier's check. An Exhibit
was introduced which consisted of a Tracy Collins check payable to
Ray Ortiz in the sum of $5,000.00 (Exhibit "H", Pg. 13).

The

witness stated that Mr. Ortiz told him that the fellow at Valley
Bank had received the July 15, 1987 check (Pg. 15).
Mr. Corona testified that about August 4, 1987, Mr. Ortiz told
Mr. Corona that a second $5,000.00 payment was needed because they
were getting ready to send the papers to Denver and that the person
needed to have another $5,000.00 check to make sure that Mr. Corona
wasn't going to change his mind (Pg. 17). Mr. Corona indicated
that he went to Tracy Collins Bank and obtained another check under
the name of "Richard L. Gray" (Pg. 20). He stated that the name,
Richard Gray, was used because he obtained that name through some
of the papers that Mr. Ortiz had left for him to sign and that in
the papers, there was located a card from Richard L. Gray at Valley
Bank (Pg. 21).
4

The witness testified that the next day, Mr. Ortiz came to
him and indicated that the name had to be changed because the
person didn't want it in his name and it had to be under the name
of Ray Ortiz (Pg. 25).

Mr. Corona indicated that Mr. Ortiz

indicated that Richard Gray had allegedly stated that he did not
want to show that he had accepted any money concerning the loan
and, therefore, Mr. Corona obtained a second cashier's check on
August 7, 1987 which was substituted for the check with the name
of Richard Gray and delivered it to Mr. Ortiz (Pg. 26).

The

witness indicated that Mr. Ortiz told him that he would proceed
through and obtain the S.B.A. loan with that and that he would
guarantee the loan (Pg. 27).
Mr. Corona stated that he did not receive an S.B.A. loan
through any of the loan applications that he had signed up through
the date of the trial (Pg. 27). He indicated that Mr. Ortiz kept
telling him not to worry about the loan, stating that "it's there."
Later, he paid a $100.00 retainer fee and another fee of
$400.00 to a person to assist him to fill out forms for an S.B.A.
loan which he obtained through Brighton Bank.

He indicated he

never did receive the $10,000.00 back, which had been transferred
to Mr. Ortiz.
On cross-examination, Mr. Corona testified that sometime in
August of 1987, he met freguently with a person by the name of Rick
Hansen (Pg. 36). He stated that whenever he was at Eagle Tire, the
business establishment which was managed by Mr. Ortiz, that Mr.
Rick Hansen was there on a daily basis.
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He understood that Mr.

Rick Hansen was a silent partner of Mr* Ortiz and that Mr* Corona
met with Mr* Hansen and a person from Atlanta, Georgia, who was in
Salt Lake City to help obtain a loan through Ray Ortiz (Pg. 42).
Mr. Corona testified that this person, Gerry Hancey-Hedderick,
discussed with him on three or four occasions, possible loans and
indicated to him that Ray Ortiz had sent her to Salt Lake City to
help Mr. Corona get the loan (Pg. 43). He indicated that he even
paid

the

expenses

of

$500.00

to

Gerry

Hancey-Hedderick

in

connection with her trips to Salt Lake City (Pg. 45).
The witness testified that he kept limited notes of the
transaction and that the business card which allegedly was given
to him by the Defendant, was discarded and that he obtained a card
which he originally identified to the police as being the card
which he received from Mr. Ortiz directly from Valley Bank and Mr.
Gray, when he went there personally concerning a loan (Pg. 49).
He had no copies of any of the loan documents which he supposedly
had signed, and identified at trial a packet of documents which he
said were "similar" to the package of documents which he had
allegedly signed (Pg. 51).
The State's principal witness also identified Defendant's
Exhibit #10 which was a check made out to him for $10,000.00 from
Eagle Tire.

Mr. Corona indicated that Ray Ortiz gave him that

check on or about September 1, 1987 and that it did not clear the
bank.
The second witness called by the State of Utah at the trial
was Richard Gray, a commercial loan officer at Valley Bank (Pg.
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80). He testified that he recalled receiving a telephone call from
Mr. Corona concerning an inguiry about getting an S.B.A. loan (Pg.
87).

On cross-examination, he admitted that Mr. Corona just asked

about setting up an S.B.A. loan and did not discuss any problems
or anything unusual about the loan process. Mr. Gray indicated the
Mr. Corona had no complaints concerning him or his processing of
any loans and that if Mr. Corona had come in and told him that he
had paid to Mr. Gray the sum of $10,000.00 for an S.B.A. loan, that
he would have recalled that fact (Pg. 88).
After the State rested, the Defendant called as the first
witness, Officer Scott Hansen who testified that he was employed
at the Murray City Police Department and was contacted by Mr.
Corona (Pg. 96). He also testified to many statements that Mr.
Corona had made to him at the time of the initial reports to the
officer in this matter.

One of the statements that was reported,

indicated that Mr. Corona stated that Mr. Ortiz' $10,000.00 was to
be used as a fee for expenses and assisting to secure a $400,000
loan through the S.B.A. (Pg. 98). The officer admitted that at the
time of the preliminary hearing, he testified that the card which
Mr. Corona gave to him was a card which was given to Mr. Corona by
Mr. Ortiz and not a card which he had obtained independently from
Mr. Gray at Valley Bank (Pg. 99).
The second defense witness was Andy Ortiz, the father of Ray
Ortiz, who is a retired construction worker, who received a
telephone call, in August, 1987, from Mr. Corona (Pg. 104). In
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that telephone conversation, Mr* Ortiz indicated that Mr. Corona
stated that the $10,000.00 was a loan to his son (Pg. 105).
The final witness called by the defense was the Defendant,
Raymond Ortiz, who testified that, in the summer of 1987, he
managed Eagle Tire store, in Murray, Utah for the owner, Mr. Rick
Hansen (Pg. 110). All of the checking accounts were in the name
of Rick Hansen and he did not have any signature authority on any
of the accounts.

He indicated that he and another employee did

most of the mechanical work in relation to the installation of
tires and that Mr. Hansen took care of the financial activities
(Pg. 111).

He indicated that, in 1987, he met Mr. Corona, who

operated the bar next to the tire store and that Mr. Corona stated
that he was trying to get a loan and was unsuccessful in obtaining
a loan. Mr. Ortiz indicated that he told him that he knew someone
who probably could get him a loan if he was really interested in
it and that he transferred the cash from the two $5,000.00 checks
he received to Mr. Rick Hansen.

Mr. Ortiz testified that Gerry

Hancey-Hedderick gave him a business card similar to the business
card which was given to Mr. Corona which had been introduced into
evidence. He stated he had never known her personally and that she
was an acguaintance of Mr. Rick Hansen and that she met with Mr.
Corona, Mr. Hansen and himself in the summer of 1987 (Pg. 123).
Mr. Ortiz indicated that most of Mr. Corona's conversations
took place with Mr. Hansen and not himself and that, as far as he
knew, Gerry Hancey-Hedderick was going to obtain the loan and that
the loan had been approved for Mr. Corona (Pg. 126).
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He stated

that he did not guarantee the loan as Mr. Corona had testified (Pg.
127).

The witness testified that in November, 1987, he had been

convicted of prior felonies involving Communications Fraud and
Theft by Deception (Pg. 128).
On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that the only
reason he knew the checks were in his name was because Mr. Corona
trusted him. He stated that the dealings were taking place between
Mr. Hansen and Mr. Corona and his only involvement was in cashing
the checks and turning the money over to Mr. Hansen (Pg. 131). Mr.
Ortiz indicated that he had attempted to pay back the funds because
he felt there was a moral obligation because of the money that Mr.
Corona had paid out, even though he contemplated bringing a lawsuit
against Mr. Hansen in this matter (Pg. 141).
During closing argument, the Prosecutor made the following
argument to which the Court sustained an objection by defense
counsel:
Even though the dates of those convictions are less than
a year apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he is also charged,
in 1987, with identical crimes, that is not the purpose
of the felony convictions. That is to be used only if
you find and believe that such a fact indicates that a
person is more likely to tell a falsehood to question his
credibility. I have heard other arguments in other cases
where it says, "Well, look, if he gets on the stand and
has to admit to those felonies and take the risk of being
convicted on that, he must be telling the truth." Well,
he obviously didn't change his behavior from 1985 to
1986.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR
THEFT BY DECEPTION.
Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a pretrial Motion to limit
evidence of prior convictions under Utah Rules of Evidence 609.
(Transcript of Pretrial Motions of 3-31-88, page 2.) The Defendant
had been convicted in November, 1987, with the felony offenses of
Communications Fraud and Theft by Deception, and the defense made
a pretrial Motion to limit this evidence which was heard by the
trial Court and denied.
The Defendant argued that under the authority of State v.
Gentry, 747 P. 2d, 1032 (Utah, 1987), and Rule 609 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, that the prior convictions in Utah for Theft by
Deception must be excluded in the pending Theft by Deception
matter.

In Gentry, the Supreme Court held that in an aggravated

sexual assault trial, the Defendant's prior rape conviction should
have been excluded at trial. After noting that the crime of rape
did not inherently reflect the Defendant's credibility, the Court
stated:
Also significant is the similarity between the
conviction and the crime for which defendant was tried,
aggravated sexual assault. This was highly likely to
prejudice jurors and unduly influence their conclusion
concerning defendant's guilt.
Counsel for the Defendant Ortiz, argued in support of the Motion
as follows:
So I would submit that the Court cannot, just
because the prior offense is Theft by Deception or
Communications Fraud, determine that they are necessarily
involving dishonesty or false statements.
10

Finally, I think that under Rule 403, that this
Court has discretion to use the weighing factors set
forth in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph (a) to determine
even if it's an offense that involves dishonesty or false
statements. That under Rule 403, which is — the Court
can still determine that the prejudicial effect and the
prejudicial effect of having similar offenses coming in
against Mr* Ortiz if he takes the stand outweighs the
probative value. The Court's inherent power under Rule
403 to control the trial would also give the Court power,
and we'd ask the Court to grant the motion on that basis.
The Court denied the Motion and allowed the Defendant to be
examined about the conviction.

The Defendant testified on direct

questioning concerning the conviction in an attempt to mitigate the
result of the Court's ruling.
In the recent case of State v. Wight (Case Number 87-558-CA,
Utah, 1988) this Court extensively reviewed the federal decision
concerning Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence. Indicating that the
new Utah Rules of Evidence were intended to provide a fresh
starting place, the Court followed interpretations given to Rule
609 by the federal cases of United States v. Carroll, 663 F. Supp.
210 (D. Md. 1986) and United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F. 2d 1049
(D.C. Cir., 1983).
This Court approved of the procedure employed in United States
v. Carroll, where the trial court applied a factual inquiring
process in a case where the prosecution wished to use prior
convictions for Bank Larceny and Theft.

The Court noted that the

proponent, the prosecutor, had the burden of showing the conviction
rested on facts warranting the dishonesty or false statement
description.

United States v. Papia, 560 P. 2d 827, at 847 (7th

Cir. 1977).
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In Wight, the Court indicated that under 609 (a)(2) inguiry
should be made regarding the particular facts involved to determine
if honesty was a factor*
involved

in

the

If the trial court finds honesty is

underlying

offense,

evidence

of

the

prior

conviction is automatically admissible under 609 (a)(2). The Court
then stated:
If such inguiry is not made or does not reveal acts
of dishonesty or false statement, the trial court must
apply 609(a) (1) and weigh probativeness against prejudice
to the defendant in determining admissibility. Contrary
to the concurring opinion, we do not believe this will
be a burden on the trial courts, but will give them
greater flexibility to either find circumstances
indicating dishonesty, or engage in a balancing process
to determine probative value, an exercise with which
trial courts are familiar.
The Court

of Appeals

then

found

that

since

no inguiry

concerning the underlying facts about the robbery conviction of
Mr. Wightf s was made by the trial court, the conviction was not
admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence, 609(a)(2).

Furthermore,

because the trial Judge did not employ on the record the criteria
set forth in State v. Banner, 717 P. 2d 1325 (Utah, 1986), the Court
found that error was committed in introducing the prior conviction
and denying the Motion to limit the evidence. The Court found the
error in that case to be harmless after a review of the record
concerning the consumption of alcohol, blood alcohol content and
other facts concerning the auto accident.
In Appellant's case, the Defendant asked the Court to consider
the prejudicial effect of introducing a conviction identical to the
conviction for which the Appellant was on trial and to weigh the
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harmful

effect of

conviction*

requiring

the Defendant

to answer

to the

The potential for prejudice was as great in this case

as was present in State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah, 1987).
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer any
incriminating documentary evidence other than two $5,000.00 checks
used to transfer funds. The purpose of the transfer of funds was
based upon the testimony of the alleged victim, Reginald Corona,
as apparent by the testimony of the Defendant.

The State did not

produce any of the loan applications or similar documents which Mr.
Corona purportedly signed in relation to this matter.

The State

did not present any evidence of any underlying facts of the prior
conviction.
since

the

The prosecutor in the pretrial motions argued that
underlying

charge

of

Theft

by

Deception

involved

dishonesty or false statements that the similar conviction should
be used because the "main essence of the case" was credibility.
(Transcript of Pretrial Motions, 3-31-88, page 9.)
The critical consequences of denying the Motion to Exclude
the Evidence in the context of this case is graphically illustrated
by the manner in which the prosecutor used the conviction in
closing argument.

The record reflects the following argument to

the jury:
MR. IWASAKI: The fact that a witness has been convicted
of a felony and/or convicted of a crime involving
dishonest or false statement is to be used by you only
in weighing his credibility.
I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortiz guilty of Theft by
Deception because he's previously been convicted of Theft
by Deception, and he's previously been convicted of a
Communications Fraud.
13

Even though the dates of those convictions are less than
a year apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he's also charged
in 1987 with identical crimes, that is not the purpose
of the felony convictions. That is to be used only if
you find and believe that such a fact indicates a person
is more likely to tell a falsehood to question his
credibility.
I've heard other arguments in other cases where it says,
"Well, look if he gets on the stand and has to admit to
those felonies and take the risk of being convicted on
that, he must be telling the truth." Well, he obviously
didn't change his behavior from 1985 to 1986.
MR GAITHER:

I am going to object, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. IWASAKI: The testimony is not believable, and it is
a basis for you to look at the prior felony convictions.
(Transcript of the Trial, page 151).
Therefore, the Court should enter an order revoking the
conviction and awarding the Appellant a trial not prejudicially
tainted by the improper evidence.
POINT II
THE REMARKS OF THE PROSECUTOR DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT,
OBJECTED TO BY THE DEFENDANT, REQUIRED THE GRANTING OF
A NEW TRIAL.
In State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah, 1986), the Supreme
Court reviewed a criminal case in which a prosecutor, in his
closing argument, improperly argued that Defendant's prior burglary
conviction demonstrated his criminal character. That case involved
theft by receiving trial in which the Defendant took the stand and
testified that he had been previously convicted of a burglary.
Tarafa, the Prosecutor made the following argument:
It's a criminal mind. He's a thief with a criminal mind
and a criminal mind at work here . . . .
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In

The Defendant is the kind of person, ladies and
gentlemen, who would use a false credit card to obtain
property for himself* He is the kind of person who would
commit a burglary, who would go into someone's home and
steal their purse—he admitted he did*

He is the kind of person who would obtain property
by fraudulent use of a credit card, and I ask you to
weigh that and weigh that heavily when you examine the
testimony he gave you* He's the kind of person who would
walk into somebody's home and steal their purse. He's
a thief, and I'd ask you to weigh that carefully when you
weigh his testimony.
As in the Defendant's case, the defense counsel objected and
made a Motion for a mistrial.

The Utah Supreme Court stated that

under the Utah Rules of Evidence, 404 (a)(3), 608 (b) and 609, the
Prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that Defendant had a
propensity to commit crime. The Court then discussed the test set
forth in State v* Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah, 1984) which should be
used

to

determine

whether

prosecutional

reversal in a particular case.

misconduct

merits a

In reviewing, the Court said that

the Troy test had the following threshold:
1)

Whether the remarks called the attention of the jurors
to matters which they were not justified in considering
in determining their verdict/ and,

2)

Whether

the

jurors, under the circumstances

of the

particular case, were probably influenced by the remarks.
In

this

case, the

Defendant-Appellant

submits

that

the

Prosecutor was aware of the proscription placed in arguing in the
area

concerning

the

Defendant's

character.

The

Prosecutor

attempted to state his positive argument in a negative light by
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stating

"I'm not saying, 'find Mr* Ortiz guilty because he's

previously been convicted of Communications Fraud'"*

The attorney

for the State argued in a manner which belies his knowledge of the
improper use of the evidence*

The County Attorney is not charged

with admonishing the jury not to use the evidence in an improper
way.

A full reading of his arguments establishes that he was

calling to the jury matters which they were not justified in
considering and the jury was influenced by those remarks*
CONCLUSION
The Defendant-Appellant was denied a fair trial by the denial
of the Order which would have protected him from the prejudicial
effect of the prior similar case for which he was on trial.

The

error was aggravated and compounded by the Prosecutor's sly remarks
designed to emphasize the prejudicial and improper use of the
evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

f day of January ,^T989.

IDALL GApHEIT
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing

Brief

of Appellant was hand delivered

to Attorney

General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
on this

day of January, 1989.
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ADDENDUM
1) Copy of relevant portions of closing argument and
Objection, pages 152 and 153.

1

ordered to sustain in this case.

2

reasonable standard because as reasonable people, you can

3

see through the testimony of Mr. Ortez and the attempt to

4

try and foist all the blame onto the empty chair.

5

And I gladly accept the

The fact that a witness has been convicted

6

of a felony and/or convicted of a crime involving

7

dishonest or false statement is to be used by you only in

8

weighing his credibility.

9

I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortez guilty of

10

theft by deception because he's previously been convicted

11

of theft by deception, and he's previously been convicted

12

of a communications fraud.

13

Even though the dates of those convictions

14

are less than a year apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he's

15

also charged in 1987 with identical crimes, that is not

L6

the purpose of the felony convictions.

L7

used only if you find and believe that such a fact

L8

indicates a person is more likely to tell a falsehood.

L9

To question his credibility.

20

That is to be

I've heard other arguments in other cases

21

where it says, "Well, look if he gets on the stand and

22

has to admit to those felonies and take the risk of being

23

convicted on that, he must be telling the truth."

24

he obviously didn't change his behavior from 1985 to '86.

25

MR. GAITHER:

Well,

I am going on object, your
151

1

Honor.

2

THE COURT;

3

MR. IWASAKI:

Sustained.
The testimony is not

4

believable, and it is a basis for you to look at the

5

prior felony convictions.
Everybody talked about the checks.

6

Look at

7

the check made out to Richard Gray.

8

Mr. Corona's testimony, Mr. Corona made the check out to

9

Richard Gray because he found that information on the

10

As you recall

business card.
You've heard testimony of Richard Gray that

11
12

he gives out packets of that nature.

This was not a name

13

that was just pulled out of the air regardless of whether

14

he wrote it down or subsequently lost it or threw it in

15

his desk or whatever.

16

person with SBA with Valley Bank.

17

coincidences.

18

Valley Bank through SBA that Mr. Ortez said the loan was

19

going to be going through.

Richard Gray is a person and is a
Coincidence of all

The same type of person, an official at

Now, Mr. Corona says he issued him this

20
21

check, and the next day Mr. Ortez comes back and says,

22

"Ah, change that.

23

this thing.

24

Mr. Ortez says that Mr. Hansen told him , "Hey, change

25

this.

He doesn't want his name involved in

Put it in my name, cash."

Don't. want Gray's name on it.
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All right,

Put it in your

